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Corporate Political Speech:
The Effect of First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory
Limitations on Corporate Referendum
Spending
BY FRANCIS H. Fox*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in First National Bank
v. Bellotti' held that business corporations have a first amend-
ment right to spend money to communicate views on referen-
dum issues. By striking down a Massachusetts statute which
forbade corporate attempts to influence the vote by either con-
ributions to referendum committees or expenditures for direct
advertising, the Supreme Court for the first time held that
business corporations' have a constitutional right to engage in
political speech.
Bellotti is the logical culmination of three strands of con-
stitutional principle. First, it recognizes that the Constitution
protects the right of the listener as much as it protects the right
of the speaker.3 Second, it perceives that the first amendment's
purposes are better served by allowing the untrammeled use of
means of communication than by enacting legislation designed
to foster equality of access to those means.4 Finally, it recog-
* Partner in the firm of Bingham, Dana & Gould in Boston, Massachusetts. B.S.
1955, College of the Holy Cross, LL.B. 1963, Harvard University. Mr. Fox represented
the appellants before the Supreme Court in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct.
1407 (1978).
98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978).
2 As well as "media" corporations-those owning newspapers, etc. (the institu-
tional press). The distinction is discussed id. at 1418-19.
3 E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of other is wholly foreign to the First amendment. ); Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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nizes that commercial speech is entitled to first amendment
protection.5 The five-to-four split among the Justices' testifies
to the different views and competing principles in this area of
constitutional concern; future cases delineating the boundaries
of corporate free speech are certain to arise.
This article will assess the impact of the Bellotti case on
the area of the law most immediately affected: state regulation
of corporate spending to influence the vote on referendum ques-
tions. Questions concerning Bellotti's impact upon prohibi-
tions relating to spending in favor of a particular candidate will
not directly be addressed.7
I. THE CASE
Massachusetts has regulated election spending by corpora-
tions since 1907. At first, corporations were prohibited from
spending money for the benefit of candidates or political par-
ties, or to influence the vote on any referendum question.8 A
subsequent amendment allowed corporations to spend in order
to influence the vote on any referendum question relating to a
proposed "taking, purchasing or acquiring" of the corporation's
"property, business or assets" and a later amendment allowed
corporations to spend on any question "affecting" the corpo-
rate property, business or assets.9 In 1943 this standard was
modified to allow such spending only if the question
"materially" affected the corporate property, business, or as-
sets. 10
" E.g., Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger wrote a concur-
ring opinion. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall joined in one dissent and Justice
Rehnquist filed a separate dissent.
I See note 98 infra for a 'discussion of the resolution of the problem of corporate
candidate campaign spending by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
1907 Mass. Acts ch. 576, § 22; 1907 Mass. Acts ch. 581.
1911 Mass. Acts ch. 422; 1938 Mass. Acts ch. 75.
' 1943 Mass. Acts ch. 273 § 1. See Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 183 N.E.2d 871, 874
(Mass. 1962).
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A. The Statute at Work
The provision of the Massachusetts Constitution that al-
lows income taxes has always forbidden graduated rates." In
1962 a referendum question proposed to amend the state con-
stitution to allow the legislature to impose graduated income
taxes.1 2 In Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc.,'" the Massachusetts Su-
ireme Judicial Court ruled that corporations could spend
money to oppose this referendum question. On a very sparse
record, the court ruled that since the proposed amendment
might result in graduated rates upon corporate income as well
as upon individual income, a board of directors might reasona-
bly conclude that it would materially affect the corporation.
Corporate money flowed into the campaign and the proposed
amendment was defeated."
A similar referendum was defeated in 1966.' s In 1972 a
referendum seeking the same constitutional amendment was
again proposed. However, the legislature had amended the sta-
tutory prohibition against corporate spending so that no refer-
endum concerning the taxation of individuals would be deemed
" MASS. CONST., amend. art.44.
" The proposed amendment provided:
Article - _. Full power and authority are hereby given and
granted to the general court in the alternative to the exercise of the power
and authority to impose and levy a tax on income in the manner provided
in Article XLIV of the amendments to the Constitution of the Common-
wealth, to impose and levy a tax on incomes at rates which are proportional
or graduated according to the amount of income received, irrespective of the
source from which it may be derived, and to grant reasonable exemptions,
deductions and abatements. Any property the income from which is taxed
under the provisions of this article may be exempted from the imposition and
levying of proportional and reasonable assessment rates and taxes as at
present authorized by the Constitution. This article shall not be construed
to limit the power of the general court to impose and levy reasonable duties
and excises.
Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 183 N.E.2d 871, 872 n.1 (Mass. 1962).
23 183 N.E.2d 871 (Mass. 1962).
24 The history of the corporate spending statute and the Massachusetts legisla-
ture's attempts to amend the constitution to allow graduated income taxes is described
in Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. at 1412 n.3, app. at 24-26; Brief for Appellant at 20 n.5. See
Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 183 N.E.2d 871, 871 (Mass. 1962); First Nat'l Bank v. Attor-
ney Gen., 290 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1972); First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d
1262 (Mass. 1977) (this was the Belloti case at the state level).
,1 Brief for Appellant at 20 n.5, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978).
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materially to affect a corporation. 6 In a challenge to that ex-
pansion of the statutory prohibition, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court allowed corporate money to be spent to
oppose the 1972 income tax referendum. 17 Three justices ruled
that the 1972 referendum pertained to both corporate and indi-
vidual taxation and that the statutory amendment should pro-
hibit corporate spending only on referenda that solely per-
tained to individual taxation." Two of the justices thought that
the statutory amendment did apply to prohibit corporations
from spending money on the 1972 referendum question but that
such a prohibition violated the first amendment rights of cor-
porations. 9 As a result of that decision, corporate money was
spent in the 1972 campaign and the referendum question was
defeated by about a two-to-one margin. 0 In this historical con-
text the Massachusetts legislature passed the law that was
struck down by the Supreme Court in Bellotti.
The legislature, for the fourth time since 1962, certified a
graduated tax referendum question for the ballot.2' The legisla-
ture took steps to assure, once and for all, that corporate money
remained out of the campaign. The statutory prohibition
against corporate spending was amended to provide that no
ballot question solely concerning individual taxation would be
deemed materially to affect a corporation.2 2 The graduated tax
" 1972 Mass. Acts ch. 458. See First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 290 N.E.2d 526,
529 n.3.
11 First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 290 N.E.2d 526. This suit was brought by
four corporations, three of which were among the five which subsequently brought the
Bgllotti case.
" Id. at 541.
, Id. at 539.
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407 app. at 25 (1978).
21 The process for placing a so-called legislative amendment to the Massachusetts
Constitution before the voters is cumbersome. The proposed amendment must be
passed by the House and the Senate, in joint session, in each of two separate legislative
sessions, before the question will go on the ballot. MAss. CONST., amend. art. 48. Each
of the four times the legislature passed the proposed amendments by top-heavy majori-
ties, but each time the people voted them down by substantial margins. See Brief for
Appellant at 20 n.5, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978), and sources
cited in note 14 supra.
21 1973 Mass. Acts ch. 348. The statute as it existed in 1976 read, in pertinent part:
[N]o business corporation. . .shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend
or contribute, or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money or
other valuable thing for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the
[Vol. 67
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referendum question certified for the 1976 election was one
which solely related to individual taxes m The penalties for
violation of the prohibition were increased to include corporate
fines of up to $50,000 and jail sentences of up to one year for
any individual assisting a corporate violation.
24
Five corporate plaintiffs challenged the statute in a decla-
ratory judgment action brought against the Massachusetts At-
torney General. The plaintiffs' management believed that the
proposed tax, although imposed only upon individuals, would
adversely affect the business climate in the state and thus have
an impact upon the plaintiff corporations. Plaintiffs believed
that the tax would make it more difficult to attract and keep
executive talent in the state, that it would reduce disposable
income, and that it would discourage industries from remain-
ing in or locating in Massachusetts.2m The Attorney General
nomination or election of any person to public office, or aiding, promoting
or antagonizing the interests of any political party, or influencing or affecting
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. No ques-
tion submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income,
property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect
the property, business or assets of the corporation. No person or persons, no
political committee, and no person acting under the authority of a political
committee, or in its behalf, shall solicit or receive from such corporation or
such holders of stock any gift, payment,expenditure, contribution or promise
to give, pay, expend or contribute for any such purpose.
Any corporation violating any provision of this section shall be punished
by a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars and any officer, director or
agent of the corporation violating any provision thereof or authorizing such
violation, or any person who violates or in any way knowingly aids or abets
the violation of any provision thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law Co-op 1978) (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court majority opinion in Bellotti did not expressly pass on the validity of the legisla-
tive judgment that a personal income tax issue could not have a material effect on
corporations. 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1414 n.6. (1978). Justice White, in dissent, pointed out
that the legislature's decision "is not disapproved by this Court today." Id. at 1430.
21 This proposed amendment differed from the earlier versions, see note 12 supra,
in granting power "to levy a tax on personal incomes at rates which are graduated."
The complete text is set forth in First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262,
1265 n.3.
" See statute quoted in note 22 supra.
"' A detailed statement of the relationship of each plaintiff to the state's economy
and the beliefs of its management is found in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct.
1407 app. at 15-24 (1978).
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agreed that plaintiffs' management believed that the proposed
tax would materially affect the corporations but denied that it
would in fact do o.26
Plaintiffs attacked the statute as a deprivation of first
amendment rights, as a denial of equal protection, as being
unduly vague, and as improperly utilizing an irrebuttable pre-
sumption in a criminal case (the presumption that a ballot
question solely relating to individual taxes could not materially
affect a corporation). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts unanimously rejected each of these arguments, hold-
ing the statute to be valid and enforceable.Y
With respect to the first amendment claim, the court held
that, although corporations had first amendment rights, those
rights could be limited to speech that was material to the cor-
poration's business or assets." Since the statute in question
allowed corporate speech as to matters which would materially
affect the corporation, the statute exactly matched the consti-
tutional requirements. The statement of agreed facts had not
contained a finding that the referendum question would in fact
materially affect plaintiffs; thus plaintiffs had failed to prove
that-the statute was unconstitutional.2 9
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The majority opinion articulated a broad and sweeping decla-
ration of the right of the public to hear political communica-
tions from all sources. The nature or identity of the speaker was
" 98 S. Ct. at 1412-13, 1413 n.4. See also, First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359
N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Mass. 1977).
359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977). The judgment of the court without opinion was
entered prior to the election, on September 28, 1976. The opinion was filed in February
1977.
u Id. at 1270.
1 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1413-14 (1978). Plaintiffs had not
sought an actual trial on the merits wherein they might attempt to prove by expert
testimony that the referendum question would in fact materially affect corporations.
Plaintiffs argued that to allow speech only after forcing the speaker to establish the
truth of his contentions to the satisfaction of a jury would impose an unconstitutional
prior restraint upon first amendment activity. Thus, they did not seek to show that
they did not come within the statute's restrictions, but attempted to show it was void
on its face.
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of little moment;" the speech was protected under the Consti-
tution.
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would sug-
gest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is
the type of speech indispensable to decision-making in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes
from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual.'
The majority opinion could find no support in precedent or
logic for the proposition that corporations, as creatures of the
state, could be limited by the state in their ability to communi-
cate.2 Neither could it find any basis for distinguishing be-
tween media corporations and other corporations as far as the
constitutional right to communicate is concerned."
Having found that the Massachusetts statute directly
impinged upon protected speech and having found no basis for
excluding corporations frbm the protection that should be af-
forded the speech, the Court examined the statute under the
"strict scrutiny" standard. 4 The statute's possible purpose of
preserving the electoral process from the undue influence of
wealthy interests was found to be unsound" and, in any event,
3 See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). Buckley had already made clear
that restrictions on the amount of money that can be spent upon political communica-
tion were direct restrictions upon communication itself. The Massachusetts court itself
had emphatically recognized this in an earlier case, stating that groups need money
to communicate political views "and if all use of money were to be denied them the
result would be to abridge even to the vanishing point any effective freedom of speech,
liberty of the press, and right of peaceable assembly." Bowe v. Secretary of the Com-
monwealth, 69 N.E.2d 115, 130 (Mass. 1946).
1' 98 S. Ct. at 1416.
2 Id. at 1417 n.14.
3Id. at 1417-20. As appellants had argued in their brief, the views of the largest
bank in New England on the question of whether or not a particular tax might discour-
age employers from locating in Massachusetts might be more interesting to the voter
than the views of Sports Illustrated magazine on this same subject, although Sports
Illustrated is owned by a "media corporation," which a bank is decidedly not. The
Court rejected appellees' attempt to draw a distinction between the "institutional
press" and other corporations.
' Id. at 1421. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
" The Court stated that the possibility of corrupting candidates is not present in
1978-79]
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not supported by the record. 6 The purpose of protecting the
interests of shareholders who might not want to hear their cor-
poration take a political view was, similarly, treated with skep-
tidism"7 and, even if valid, seen as not achieved by a statute
which was both underinclusive and overinclusive.s The refer-
endum prohibitions were held to be void on their face.3'
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion pointed out the
many problems that would accrue were the Court to differen-
tiate between media corporations and other kinds of business
corporations with respect to the first amendment. He strongly
rejected the notion that the "Press Clause confers upon the
'institutional press' any freedom from government restraint not
enjoyed by all others."40 His opinion1 explores fascinating con-
stitutional issues which would have arisen had the Court ruled
against the plaintiffs in the manner suggested by the White
dissent.
42
a referendum campaign. The possibility that the electorate might be overwhelmed by
the arguments made by corporate interests was deemed a risk required by the Consti-
tution: "But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information
and arguments advanced-by appellants, it is a danger contemplated by the Framers
of the First Amendment." 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1423-24 n.30.
Corporations had spent substantial sums in earlier referendum campaigns, see
note 101 infra, but had not dominated the scene. 98 S. Ct. at 1423. In the 1976
campaign no corporate money had been spent. Id. at 1423 n.28.
" The majority opinion questions why "the dissenting shareholder's wishes are
entitled to such greater solicitude in this context than in many others where equally
important and controversial corporate decisions are made by management .... Id.
at 1425 n.34.
Id. at 1424-26.
3' Id. at 1426.
40 "Because the First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and
communicate ideas, I can see no difference between the right of those who seek to
disseminate ideas by way of a newspaper and those who give lectures or speeches and
seek to enlarge the audience by publication and wide dissemination." 98 S. Ct. at 1429.
See also Burger's opinion a few days after Bellotti in Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia, 98 S. Ct. 1535 (1978) (upholding a press claim).
But see Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1971), and Justice
Stewart's dissents in Brazburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) and Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1978).
" Chief Justice Burger also joined in the majority opinion. 98 S. Ct. at 1426.
4 One controversial aspect of Burger's concurring opinion was his suggestion that
"media conglomerates" could be more dangerous to the electoral process than non-
media corporations who are "not regularly concerned with shaping popular opinion on
public issues," in that it might be easier for the media corporations to dominate an
election. Id. at 1426-27.
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Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist dis-
sented. 3 Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in a dissent
authored by Justice White 4" which disagreed with almost every
aspect of the majority opinion. Justice White believed that the
Massachusetts statute advanced first amendment interests,
rather than curtailed them, and thus did not need to survive
strict scrutiny. 45 He expressed confidence, however, that the
statute could "survive even the most exacting scrutiny." 46 Jus-
tice White found that the Massachusetts statute served essen-
tially the same purposes outlined in Justice Powell's opinion.
He felt, however, that these purposes were very important and
he believed that the statute properly and rationally served
them.47 Justice White went further and expressed the view that
corporate communications, since they do not represent a mani-
festation of individual freedom or choice, are entitled to less
first amendment protection than is speech which embodies
individual self-expression. Restricting corporate speech would
not significantly diminish any particular expression of views
because individuals would remain free to communicate all
viewpoints.49 The disagreement between the majority and Jus-
tice White's dissent is, in a word, total.5  "
Justice Rehnquist's separate dissent stressed the fact that
corporations are artifical creatures of the state and that, al-
though the state could not deprive corporations of property
without due process, it could limit corporate speech to topics
material to that property.5'
0 98 S. Ct. at 1430-43.
" Id. at 1430.
" Id. at 1434-39.
" Id. at 1430.
" Id. at 1430-39.
" Id. at 1432.
"Id.
Justice White's opinion recognized that newspapers and "other forms of litera-
ture" could not be silenced merely because they were produced by corporations, but
he indicated that media corporations should not be free from electoral contribution or
expenditure limitations. 98 S. Ct. at 1432 n.8. But a prohibition upon direct or indirect
expenditures, such as MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978), would
certainly include the substantial expense of publishing views in an editorial page of a
corporate owned newspaper. Justice White does not explain how he would exempt such
expenditures from the statute. Certainly a statute which would forbid a newspaper
from taking out a political advertisement in another paper but not forbid it from
publishing the same message in its own pages does not have much to recommend it.
s" 98 S. Ct. at 1442-43.
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II. THE EFFECT OF BELLOTTi UPON STATE REGULATION OF
CORPORATE REFERENDUM SPENDING
A. The Extent of Statutory Regulation
At the time of the Bellotti argument, the parties had been
able to find thirty-one state statutes which purported to re-
strict electoral campaign spending in some way.52 Some stat-
utes did not cover referendum spending; 53 some had broad lan-
guage, prohibiting use of corporate funds for "political" pur-
poses, which had never been construed in the face of a constitu-
tional attack;54 others had similar language which had been
judicially narrowed;55 one had corporate prohibitions which
had been ruled unconstitutional." About ten states had stat-
utes that applied special restrictions to corporate spending
with language that might be broad enough to cover referen-
dum, as well as candidate, campaigns.57 Some of these statutes
52 The appellee referred to these statutes in Brief for Appellee at 32 n.19, First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978). Appellants briefly described the text of
each in Reply Brief for Appellant at 9-10 & n.6, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct.
1407 (1978).
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15. § 8004 (a) (Supp. 1977).
"' E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 210A.34 (West Supp. 1977), prohibiting corporate
contributions "for any political purpose whatsoever."
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-116 (McKinney 1977) prohibited corporate contributions
"for any political purpose whatever." This language had been construed as not apply-
ing to ballot questions in order to avoid constitutional questions. Schwartz v. Romnes,
495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974). Similarly, the Ohio statute, Oino REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.03
(Page 1972), prohibited the use of corporate funds for any "partisan political purpose,"
but had been held not to apply to "the adoption of a constitutional amendment or the
passage of a bond issue or of a tax levy. . . ." Corrigan v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.,
157 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1959).
SMONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-4744 (Supp. 1977) prohibited corporate contribu-
tions and expenditures on ballot questions and had been ruled unconstitutional in C
& C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 420 F. Supp. 1254 (D. Mont. 1976). See also Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Berkeley, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1976) (Berkeley
Election Reform Act unconstitutional).
'7 IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.29 (West Supp. 1978-79) prohibits corporate contributions
"for the purpose of influencing the vote of any elector."
Ky. REV. STAT. § 121.035(1) (Supp. 1978) prohibits corporations from furnishing
money or anything of value to any "political or quasi-political organization ... to be
used by such organization for any purpose whatever." The validity of the Kentucky
statute is discussed in Comment, The Constitutionality of Kentucky's Prohibition of
Corporate Campaign Contributions: A First Amendment Analysis (July 21, 1978)
(unpublished paper on file in Kentucky Law Journal office).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 70:2(I), (II) (1970) prohibits contributions by corpora-
[Vol. 67
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applied to unions and other organizations.s The Bellotti case,
unless unexpectedly narrowed by some future Supreme Court
decision, will make it very difficult to impose discriminatory
restrictions on corporate referendum spending. With the use of
referendum questions becoming more common, however, it is
probable that states will attempt some sort of regulation in this
area."
B. Scope of the Opinion
Predicting how Supreme Court decisions in new areas will
be construed in the future is risky business, especially when the
decision is five to four. Bellotti has cautionary language point-
ing out that the record failed to support the claimed justifica-
tions for regulation of corporate referendum spending." Per-
tions, partnerships, and labor unions for the purpose of promoting the success or defeat
of ballot questions or "measures."
N.D. CENT. CODE §16-20-08 (Supp. 1977) prohibits corporate contributions and
expenditures for any political purpose.
S.D. CoMPmED LAws ANN. § 12-25-2 (Supp. 1977) prohibits corporate contributions
to "any candidate, committee or political party."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-1932 (Supp. 1977) prohibits corporate contributions and
expenditures for the purpose of "aiding in the success or defeat of any proposition
submitted to a vote of the people."
TFx. ELEc. CODE ANN. art. 14.06 (Vernon Supp. 1978) prohibits corporations and
labor unions from making contributions and expenditures for the purpose of "aiding
or defeating the approval" of ballot questions, but it allows separate segregated funds.
W. VA. CODE § 3-8-8 (Supp. 1978) prohibits corporate contributions "for the pay-
ment of any primary or other election expenses whatever" but allows separate segre-
gated funds.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.38(1)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978-79) prohibits corporate contri-
butions and disbursements to promote or defeat referenda but allows separate segre-
gated funds.
Wyo. STAT. § 22-25-102 (1977) prohibits corporations, partnerships, trade unions
and other groups from contributing funds or election assistance to promote the success
or defeat of any ballot question.
See notes 54 supra and 58 infra, for similar statutes from other jurisdictions.
u Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.19 (1976) (applying to corporations and
labor unions) with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 15-110 (West Supp. 1976) (prohibiting
only corporate contributions).
', There are no federal referenda and there are no federal statutds purporting to
restrict corporate spending as to state referenda.
" 98 S. Ct. at 1423. The majority opinion noted the lack of "record or legislative
findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes." Id. The Court also noted that the "effect upon the speakers' business
interests" of proposed speech might be "relevant or important in a different context,"
id. at 1420 n.20, even though it reversed a lower court decision which had held that
corporate speech could be forbidden that did not materially affect the corporation.
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haps a future case might take advantage of this Bellotti caveat.
An analysis of the likely sweep of the case should begin, how-
ever, with two obvious points.
First, it is of some interest that the Court decided the case
on the merits at all. The Supreme Court had on four previous
occasions declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices Act, which curbs corporate and union
spending on federal elections." On each of these occasions, the
Court had adopted a view of the statute or of the procedural
posture of the Case which postponed a consideration of the first
amendment rights of unions and corporations. Such reluctance
to decide the merits of this constitutional issue might have
impelled the Court to dismiss appellants' appeal in Bellotti for
a similar reason, in this case, mootness.
The judgment of the Massachusetts court (without opin-
ion) was entered September 28, 1976, a few weeks before the
November 2 election. Efforts to obtain a stay or injunction
against the statute's enforcement were unavailing. The opinion
of the Massachusetts court was not handed down until Febru-
ary- 1, 1977.62 On April 18, 1977, more than five months after
the election, the Supreme Court postponed a determination of
jurisdiction, instructing the parties to brief and argue the ques-
tion of mootness as well as the merits." With the case sched-
uled to be heard about one full year after the election, the
Massachusetts Attorney General vigorously contended that the
case was moot. A strong possibility existed that the Court
would once again avoid a determination on the constitutional
merits. "4 The Court held, however, that the facts brought the
case within the "capable of repetition yet evading review" ex-
6, This statute, now appearing in 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976) has been before the Court
in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385
(1972); United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106 (1948).
,2 First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 1977).
430 U.S. 964 (1977).
"4 There has been comment that the Supreme Court has been narrowing access
to the Court by stringent application of restrictive concepts such as mootness. See the
dissenting comment of Justice Brennan in Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 140
(1977): "I have frequently voiced my concern that the recent Article II jurisprudence
of this Court in such areas as mootness and standing is creating an obstacle course of
confusing standardless rules. . . ." See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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ception to the mootness doctrine.65 The fact that the Court
forthrightly eschewed the mootness device through which it
could have avoided the whole question highlights the signifi-
cance of the majority opinion.
The second point to be recognized is the breadth of the
majority opinion itself. Although the statute raised a bevy of
questions such as due process,6 equal protection,6 freedom of
speech,66 and the right to be free of presumptions in a criminal
trial,6 there were narrow grounds on which the holding could
have been based. Although appellants argued for a broad rul-
ing, the minimum first amendment holding that they advo-
cated was that the Massachusetts court decision, which re-
quired a corporation claiming first amendment rights to prove,
at trial, that the proposed speech would be material to the
" 98 S. Ct. at 1414-15. See generally Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 515 (1911). The Bellotti Court was unanimous in its holding on mootness. In
support of its mootness holding, the Court quoted the criteria set forth in Weinstein
v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975): " '(1) The challenged action was in its duration
too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the
same action again.'" 98 S. Ct. at 1414. The Court pointed out that the approximate
19-month period of time between legislative authorization of the referenda and the
date of the election in each of the four attempts to pass a graduated tax amendment
had been "too short a period of time for appellants to obtain complete judicial review,
and there is every reason to believe that any future suit would take at least as long."
Id. at 1415. The second part of the Weinstein criteria was also satisfied, the Court said,
because "[a]ppellants insist that they will continue to oppose the constitutional
amendment, and there is no reason to believe that the Attorney General will refrain
from prosecuting violations of [the statute in question]." Id.
" May a statute forbidding corporate spending except as to matters materially
affecting the corporation be constitutionally applied to forbid expenditures pertaining
to a proposed constitutional amendment which would allow, but not require, see note
13 supra, the legislature to impose graduated personal income taxes? Or is it too vague
in that no one can foretell whether taxes will be imposed, what the tax rates will be,
whether they might later be raised, what effect such factors might have upon the
decision of corporate employees to locate in the state, and similar uncertain factors?
17 May a statute impose different spending restrictions for one type of a ballot
question than for others? May a statute impose spending prohibitions upon corpora-
tions but not upon unions, trusts, etc.?
" To what extent may corporations be prohibited from spending money on politi-
cal matters?
" May a statute prohibiting corporate spending except as to matters materially
affecting the corporation conclusively "deem" a ballot question solely pertaining to
individual taxes to have no such material effect? See note 22 supra for the wording of
the statute. Nonmateriality should be part of the prosecution's burden of proof.
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corporation, amounted to the imposition of a prior restraint.7 0
However, the Court ruled quite broadly, holding that states
may not limit corporate referendum spending to matters that
materially affect corporate assets."
Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion deliberately
went beyond the facts in the case to set forth some considera-
tions which indicate that he favors fairly broad free speech
rights for business corporations.72 This opinion, the mootness
holding, the breadth of Mr. Justice Powell's opinion, and the
fact that the case rests on some fairly basic foundations 73 justify
a view that the decision will severely restrict state attempts to
limit corporate referendum spending.
74
C. Possible Methods of Statutory Restrictions on Corporate
Referendum Spending
1. Imposition of Dollar Limitations on Contributions and
Expenditures
The Massachusetts statute striken in Bellotti contained an
absolute prohibition upon corporate contributions or expendi-
tures75 to support or oppose referendum questions if the ques-
10 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51, 58-59 (1973) ("even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose
means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty."). In ruling as
broadly as it did, of course, the Court included this principle within its holding. See
98 S. Ct. at 1420 n.21.
1, This author does not imply that narrower grounds were more appropriate than
the grounds chosen. A narrower decision would have raised more questions and led to
greater uncertainty than did the Court's decision.
See 98 S. Ct. at 1427-29.
7' See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of these basic
constitutional foundations.
11 The decision was not availing to the city of Boston in an interesting case wherein
the mayor wished to use city funds, raised by taxes, to persuade the voters to vote in
favor of a statewide referendum question which would amend the state constitution
as it relates to real estate taxes. The Supreme Judicial Court enjoined such spending.
Anderson v. City of Boston, No. 78-253 (S.J.C. for Suffolk County, order entered July
19, 1978, Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297). This situation is analagous to a labor union spending
money raised by compulsory dues. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209
(1977).
71 "Contributions" as used herein refers to transfers of money or things of value
to campaign committees. "Expenditures" refers to direct spending by the person or
entity concerned, such as paying for a newspaper or radio advertisement. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(e) and § 431(f) (1976) for a statutory description as the terms relate to candidate
campaigns.
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tions did not materially affect the corporation's assets."
Whether the imposition of a dollar limit upon expenditures or
contributions for corporate referendum spending, as opposed to
an outright ban, could survive constitutional scrutiny is one
question that arises. An inquiry into this question requires an
analysis of the principles underlying Bellotti and those under-
lying Buckley v. Valeo.
77
Buckley was an attack on the Federal Election Campaign
Act .7  The Act comprehensively regulated all aspects of the
financing of federal elections .7 A $1,000 limit was placed on the
contribution which any person 0 could make for any one candi-
date,"' and an identical limitation was placed on the expendi-
tures that a person could make on one candidate.12 The Court
recognized that both contributions and expenditures involved
freedom of expression and freedom of association and thus im-
plicated the first amendment." The purposes behind the limi-
T' See note 22 supra for the wording of the statute.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7' Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 83 Stat. 1263. The statute was amended following
Buckley. It appears now at 2 U.S.C. § 431-455 (1976).
7, The Act concerns the financing of candidates for federal office and political
parties. There being no federal referendum, the statute has never purported to address
referendum financing.
" The definition of "person" did then and still does include borporations. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(h) (1976).
11 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, title II, § 201(c), 90 Stat. 475).
11 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, title II, § 201(a), 90 Stat. 475).
424 U.S. at 14-15.
To the extent that this analysis depended upon freedom of association as well as
freedom of speech, it is relevant to note that business corporations, see California
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-511 (1972), and Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-138 (1961),
and other types of corporations, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), possess
such rights. But see A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SoME
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONs 28 n.64 (1971), for the proposition that the concept of free-
dom of association is not applicable to corporations.
Some of the successful plaintiffs in Buckley were nonprofit corporations such as
New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc. One reason the $1,000 contribution limitations
were upheld is that the Court recognized that there was some additional elbow room
for higher contributions to occur. For example, separate segregated funds of corpora-
tions and unions were not subject to the $1,000 limitation, and the opinion recognized
that many such funds operated by corporations, corporate divisions, and corporate
subsidiaries could contribute significant sums to candidates. 424 U.S. at 28 n.31. See
2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976) for the present description of such funds.
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tations were very important: to avoid the fact or appearance of
corruption.' However, the act of donating money to a candi-
date's committee was less an exercise of expression by the
donor than by the committee.85 Although this contribution in-
dicated the donor's support and implicated the freedom of as-
sociation, it was an indirect act of communication." The Court,
balancing the vital public interest in avoiding corruption
against a perceived indirect limitation of the freedom of expres-
sion and association, upheld the contribution limitation.87 The
Buckley Court struck down the expenditure limitation, finding
it to be an immediate, direct, and substantial restriction upon
political expression. 8 Although the expenditure limitation
served the compelling purpose of avoiding the fact or appear-
ance of corruption, and although expenditures might be used
as a way around the contribution limitation, it had too direct
an effect on political expression.
Thus Buckley indicates that contribution and expenditure
limitations, as well as prohibitions, implicate first amendment
rights but that some limitation can be placed on these rights.
Bellotti recognized that business corporations possess such first
amendment rights. Could some limitation be placed on corpo-
rate referendum spending that would withstand constitutional
attack? The purpose of the limitation and the means chosen to
serve it must be examined.
There are many possible forms that statutory limitations
on corporate referendum spending could take. The dollar limi-
tations might be large or small; they might apply only to busi-
ness corporations or they might apply to other groups or even
to individuals; they might or might not be coupled with some
form of notice to, or approval by, shareholders. This paper will
not address every specific form which such limitations could
take.
It might also be recognized that a particular combination
of ballot question and spending limitation might unconstitu-
tionally shackle a corporation without reference to the first
424 U.S. at 26-27.
Id. at 20-21.
" Id. at 20-21, 28-29.
' Id. at 29.
"Id. at 19, 39-51.
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amendment. A spending limitation might constitute a depriva-
tion of property without due process if it applied to a ballot
question of vital significance to the corporation." For example,
a $5,000 or $10,000 spending limitation might inadequately
allow a corporation to protect its own existence if the ballot
question related to whether the corporation's assets should be
condemned or its business taken over by a public authority.'0
Similarly, a referendum question calculated to impose prohibi-
tion might constitute a life-or-death matter to corporations in
the liquor business." While the cases may not have enunciated,
in so many words, a corporate right to self-defense, a corpora-
tion's status to invoke the due process clause in order to protect
its own property has been recognized for years.2 A spending
limitation concerning a question truly vital to the corporation
would need very little impetus from the first amendment in
order to be ruled invalid.
Assuming a referendum question of less than life-or-death
significance, a spending limitation would be judged by the
familiar process of weighing the statutory purpose against the
first amendment concerns at stake. As the Supreme Court
stated in Bigelow v. Virginia: "Regardless of the particular
label asserted by the State-whether it calls speech
'commercial' or 'commercial advertising' or 'solicitation'-a
court may not escape the task of assessing the first amendment
interest at stake and weighing it against the public interest
allegedly served by the regulation.' 3
0 It has been suggested that similar statutory restrictions could violate the due
process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See Comment, The
Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign Contributions
and Expenditures, 42 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 48 (1974).
N Such a ballot question was before the court in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Berkeley, 131 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1976) (corporate spending prohibition stricken
on first amendment grounds).
'" See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (liquor companies
advertised against prohibition initiative in Arkansas and proposal for state monopoly
of liquor sales in Washington).
2 See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). The lower court
in Bellotti held that the right to protect its property, recognized in Pierce, constituted
the full range of protected corporate speech. See First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen.,
359 N.E.2d 1262, 1270 (Mass. 1977). The Supreme Court rejected this proposed limita-
tion. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1416-21 (1978).
421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975).
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In this balancing process, the state purpose must be a
compelling one and the statute must satisfy the "exacting scru-
tiny applicable to limitations on core first amendment rights
of political expression."94 Because core first amendment rights
are at stake, the limiting statute is not entitled to the usual
presumption of validity." "The presumption rather is against
the legislative intrusion into these domains."" What, then, is
the likelihood that the legislative purpose behind a corporate
spending limitation as to referendum questions would be
deemed sufficient?
First, the need to avoid the fact or appearance of corrup-
tion, the purpose found applicable in Buckley, does not apply
to a limitation upon referendum spending. The Court in
Bellotti stated: "The risk of corruption involved in cases in-
volving candidate election. . . simply is not present in a popu-
lar vote on a public issue.""7 While a contribution to or an
expenditure for a candidate might give rise to the reasonable
fear that the candidate will repay this "debt" after the election,
there is no similar risk when the advertising message is directed
toward the voting population as a whole. A purpose similar to
that underlying the Federal Election Campaign Act, construed
in Buckley, underlies the Federal Corrupt Practices Act." Cor-
porations are forbidden to contribute money to candidates for
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976).
" See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
" United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948)(Rutledge, J., concurring).
98 S. Ct. at 1423.
"The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, now found in 2 U.S.C. § 441b, was Congress'
response, in 1907, to what was perceived as a substantial threat to the nation: the
influence which huge contributors had over candidates and thus elected officials. The
history is fully spelled out in United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 568-87 (1957).
Avoiding the fact or appearance of corruption constitutes a compelling purpose, Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1976), and the prohibitions against expenditures serve
that purpose as do the prohibitions against contributions because there is a risk that
ostensibly independent expenditures may be coordinated by the candidate, and even
if they are not coordinated, heavy expenditures might be noticed, appreciated, and
rewarded by the candidate. The FCPA applies to both unions and corporations, and
allows each to administer separate segregated funds, for political purposes, maintained
by voluntary contributions. Whether the expenditures prohibition would be upheld
would probably depend upon the legislative and record findings in any test case.
Compare the Powell and White commentaries in this regard. 98 S. Ct. at 1422 n.26,
1439. It is not clear to what extent most business corporations have any desire to be
rid of the FCPA, which shields them, in a way, from pressures to contribute to various
candidates.
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campaigns without administering segregated funds for such
purposes. The purpose of this Act makes it more likely that it
would withstand constitutional scrutiny99 than would any re-
striction on corporate referendum spending.
The most probable purposes of any statutory restriction
upon corporate referendum spending would be either to equal-
ize access to the media or to avoid the undue influence upon
public opinion which might follow from the unlimited expendi-
ture of funds by wealthy and powerful interests. These pur-
poses underlay the statute at issue in Bellotti, and varying
approval of their weight was one of the major differences sepa-
rating the majority opinion from Justice White's dissenting
opinion. With regard to undue influence, the majority opinion,
although stating that "there has been no showing that the rela-
tive voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even signif-
icant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts," ' showed lit-
tle receptivity to such a purpose. The Court indicated what
kind of a record might be sufficient to save such a statute from
constitutional attack: "If appellee's arguments were supported
by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving first amendment inter-
ests, these arguments would merit our consideration.""'' Such
" See note 61 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of challenges to this
statute.
'" 98 S. Ct. at 1423.
'' Id. The record in Bellotti showed that in the previous election, held in 1972,
corporations had contributed substantially to the committee which opposed that year's
graduated tax proposal. The record contained the names and amounts of all contribu-
tors, but there was no specific finding as to what the dollar amount of corporate
contributions was. The total amount contributed was $120,000, and the plaintiff corpo-
rations estimated that perhaps one-half of that total was contributed by corporations.
Id. app. at 25-26, 31, Brief for Appellant at 14. The total spent by the committee
supporting the proposal in 1972 was between $7,000 and $15,000. Id. at 1423 n.28. The
1976 proposal, with no corporate money spent, was defeated by about the same ratio
as was the 1972 proposal.
Statistics contained in an amicus brief indicated that in a recent California refer-
endum pertaining to nuclear power, corporations contributed $2,630,104 out of a total
$2,771,804 raised in opposition (there had been $1,903,425 raised by proponents) and
that in a recent Montana referendum, corporate opponents of a measure contributed
virtually all of the $144,300 "opposed" whereas proponents had raised only $451. Id.,
Brief of State of Montana, Amicus Curiae at 9-10. The White dissent referred to these
facts. Id. at 1434 n.11.
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a standard would be difficult to meet. Such an emphatic rejec-
tion of this "undue influence" purpose makes it appear ex-
tremely unlikely that a particular record or legislative recita-
tion of spending history would be sufficiently egregious to war-
rant the imposition of any limitation on corporate spending.
With regard to equalized access, the majority opinion
noted that earlier statutory efforts to compel equality of access
to media sources for public issues had failed, 0 2 and that
Buckley had specifically recognized that "the concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our so-
ciety in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment... "103 Such a flat rejection
of this purpose with regard to the prohibition on corporate
spending in Bellotti would also seem to carry over to a specific
limitation. It is most doubtful that any limitation could be
justified as an attempt to equalize access to the media.
Even assuming that the statutory purpose of a legislative
limit on corporate referendum spending would be found to be
"compelling," the method whereby the statute serves that pur-
pose would be subject to close examination. The Bellotti Court
recognized that legislation directed at speech must not only
serve a compelling interest but must be narrowly'04 and sensi-
bly"0 5 drawn. Thus any statute concerning itself with the "evil"
of undue influence or the dominating effect of those able to
spend large sums for political publicity should address itself to
any entity or group able to raise and expend such sums, not
merely to corporations. 1' 6 It should certainly not limit itself to
any particular question or category of question' and it should
apply not merely to efforts to dominate referendum debate but
should, in some way, address other methods whereby the politi-
cal or legislative scene could be dominated, such as by lobby-
'M Id. at 1423 n.30. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (statute requiring a newspaper to make space available to a criticized candidate
was held invalid).
11 98 S. Ct. at 1423 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
IN 98 S. Ct. at 1421. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
1*0 98 S. Ct. at 1424-26. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
'"See 98 S. Ct. at 1425.
"7 See id.
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ing.' °' Merely to mention these considerations is to indicate the
extreme difficulty that accompanies any attempt to give birth
to prohibitory legislation in this area where statutes must be
even-handed-neither overinclusive nor underinclusive.
One method of inhibiting corporate influence might be to
differentiate, by dollar limits or otherwise, between contribu-
tions to referendum campaign committees and direct referen-
dum expenditures by the putative corporate speaker. Buckley,
it will be remembered, allowed a $1,000 contribution limit to
remain while striking a similar limit upon expenditures.01
However, as noted earlier, 10 the purpose underlying the
statute in Buckley was to curb the fact or appearance of corrup-
tion. It is doubtful that legislation limiting corporate contribu-
tions in referenda campaigns would serve a sufficiently compel-
ling purpose to be able to follow Buckley's lead.
In considering the validity of a statutory scheme restrict-
ing corporate referendum contributions while allowing such
expeditures, it must be noted that such a distinction would
have a great impact on the effectiveness of the proposed
speech. Opposition to or support of a referendum issue can be
channeled far more effectively through the medium of a com-
mittee which can mount a coordinated campaign, hire profes-
sionals, etc., than by means of isolated, non-coordinated indi-
vidual communications expenditures. The Supreme Court has
recently recognized that statutes compelling resort to less effec-
tive methods of communication are not easily justified.' Thus
despite Buckley's statements that limitations upon candidate
contributions have only a "limited effect on First Amendment
freedoms,""' and that the availability of direct expenditures
I" Id. But to interfere directly with lobbying rights would incur a host of problems.
See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
"I These limitations related to candidate campaigns. See the discussion accompa-
nying footnotes 78-88 supra.
" See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
"' In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1977), the fact that sellers could advertise by other methods was not sufficient to save
a statute forbidding "for sale" signs. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976), the fact that consumers
could acquire drug price information in other ways was not sufficient to save a statute
forbidding druggists from advertising prices.
HI Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976).
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leavespersons "free to engage in independent political expres-
sion," ' the restriction nonetheless is a chafing one, and is par-
ticularly so with respect to corporate referendum spending. It
is unlikely that whatever differences there may be between cor-
porate contributions and corporate expenditures would be
deemed sufficient to allow dollar limitations to be placed on
the one even if the other is left without limits.
2. Imposition of Statutes For The Protection of Shareholders
The Commonwealth argued, in Bellotti, that the statutory
prohibition on corporate spending could be justified as a means
of protecting corporate shareholders."' The statute forbade the
use of corporate resources to advance views with which some
shareholders might disagree. The Court made no determina-
tion as to whether such a purpose could be deemed sufficiently
"compelling" to support a legislative intrustion into corporate
management's decision to publicize a political or economic
viewpoint. In a 1975 case, however, the Court had noted, with
respect to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, that "protection
of ordinary shareholders was at best a secondary concern."'1 5 In
any event, the Bellotti Court held that such a purpose was not
well served, and was in fact belied, by the statute."'
The statute in Bellotti was both underincluusive and over-
inclusive. While it forbade corporate expenditures on refer-
enda, it permitted expenditures for lobbying and expenditures
for public questions until such questions became the subject of
referenda." 7 It allowed unlimited spending on referendum
I !d.
"' 98 S. Ct. at 1424.
" Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 81 (1975). But see Comment, Corporate Political
Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 836 n.109 (1960).
The interest in protecting a minority shareholder is quite different from the inter-
est in protecting the right of a union member in a closed shop from having some part
of his compulsory dues spent to promulgate political positions with which he disagrees.
The majority opinion in Bellotti pointedly recognized this distinction, 98 S. Ct. at 1425
n.34, distinguishing such cases as Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209
(1977) and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
" "Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a 'compelling' interest
under the circumstances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation
between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appel-
lants from speaking. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. at 485." 98 S. Ct. at 1426.
"' 98 S. Ct. at 1424-25.
[Vol. 67
CORPORATE POLmCAL SPEECH
questions materially affecting a corporation's assets but pro-
hibited spending as to personal graduated income tax refer-
enda regardless of whether the corporate assets were affected. '
While forbidding business corporations from making such ex-
penditures, it left unregulated other entities or groups which
have shareholders whose beliefs may conflict with the ex-
pressed views of management. '19 Even if 100% of the sharehold-
ers authorized an expenditure of corporate funds to oppose a
graduated income tax, the statute would still forbid it.120 The
Court stated: "Ultimately shareholders may decide, through
the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corpora-
tion should engage in debate on public issues. ' 12 The question
remains whether state regulation or prohibition of corporate
spending for political expression by some means more logically
related to the rights or status of shareholders than was section
8 could be constitutionally permissible.
The specific approaches which a legislature might take to
accomplish this goal of protection are virtually limitless. With-
out examining particular legislative schemes,12 some general
observations are possible.
In theory, there is a great difference between an effort to
limit speech from a particular source on the one hand, and an
effort to assure that whatever speech emanates from a particu-
lar source fairly reflects the real position of the speaker on the
other. Any legislative effort to forbid or regulate speech from a
particular source because it may be expected to dominate a
debate or be overpersuasive, misguided, or misleading, causes
"' Id. at 1425.
" Such entities as real estate investment trusts and labor unions were not
touched by § 8. Id. This and similar arguments had been made by the plaintiff corpora-
tions as indicating a violation of equal protection. The Court, ruling in plaintiffs' favor
on first amendment grounds, did not reach the equal protection issue. Id. at 1414 n.8.
'2 Id. at 1425.
121 Id.
In Massachusetts legislators, immediately upon receipt of the Bellotti decision,
came up with a number of proposed innovations, including the imposition of a $1,000
ceiling on corporate contributions, the requirement that there be an affirmative vote
of a majority of the shareholders for any combination of spending which would exceed
$1,000 per ballot question, and vesting remedies in both the Attorney General and
dissenting shareholders to recover monetary penalties upon violation. See 1978 Mass.
House Bill No. 6086. This bill, sparked by an expected lively referendum battle in the
1978 elections, was not passed.
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severe constitutional problems and probably would not survive
court scrutiny. It is a different matter, however, to show con-
cern not about the fact or effect of speech but rather about the
question of who, among different persons arguably entitled, has
the right to determine what a pluralistic speaker has to say.
Assuming such protection is a valid state purpose and the cor-
porate (or trust or partnership) treasury is to be used to pro-
mulgate a view, which person, persons, or sub-groupings have
the right to determine what those views will be? Can the state
regulate the relationships between these persons or groups ac-
cording to recognized principles of law even though there will
be some incidental effect upon what is said? Theoretically,
there is room for legislative activity here. Practically, the area
is fraught with hazards.
The answer should depend upon whether the particular
state statute is rationally addressed to the question of allocat-
ing decision making powers among those with an interest in the
corporation, or whether the statute actually shapes or slants
what is proposed to be said. Obviously, there are legitimate
state concerns in regulating intra-corporate relationships. If
the proposed statute actually addresses those concerns it is not
in jeopardy. If in the guise of addressing those concerns it ac-
tually stifles corporate expression, the indication from Bellotti
is that it will fail.
Much would depend upon the precise way in which the
legislation sought to serve such a purpose. A statute giving a
minority group of shareholders a veto power over a good faith
decision by management to promulgate a particular view
would be doomed to fail. For example, if a statute allowed ten
percent of the shareholders to enjoin a proposed expenditure
which related to the promulgation of a viewpoint on a referen-
dum question but did not allow them otherwise to interfere
with the authority of the management and the directors, such
a statute could not withstand judicial scrutiny. The minority
shareholder's pocketbook interest would be adversely affected
by any ill-advised investment or spending decision by manage-
ment. A statute which gives such shareholders extraordinary
relief only if the spending wasted corporate money in a
"political" way would seem to belie an interest to protect the
shareholder's investment. Without giving the minority the veto
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power in all situations-a clear impossibility-uch a statute
would be underinclusive with respect to the purpose of protect-
ing minority shareholders. Such an attempt to allocate
decision-making powers within the corporation would seem
likely to fall to the first amendment right of the public to hear
as well as the right of the majority of the shareholders to have
the normal corporate process followed in decisions related to
corporate speech.123 If the various constituents of a pluralistic
entity are grappling with the question of whether to publicize
a political or economic view or to remain silent, any legislative
thumb on the scale compelling a decision in favor of silence is
more than suspect after Bellotti.
Rather than confer a veto power on a minority of share-
holders, a statute might require the vote of a predetermined
percentage of the shareholders prior to allowing management
to spend corporate money on a political question. The propo-
nents of such legislation might argue that the decision to enter
the political realm is so important and potentially controversial
that it is warranted only if a certain substantial majority-say,
two-thirds or three-fourths-are in favor of it. By analogy,
many state statutes require the consent of a substantial major-
ity of the shareholders before a corporate decision to sell or
mortgage substantially all of the corporate assets may be val-
idly acted upon.lu
Such a statute appears to achieve the purpose of protect-
ing shareholders from the dissipation of corporate resources to
advance views with which the shareholders may not agree.'2
I" The majority opinion's skeptical attitude concerning efforts to give minority
shareholders extraordinary powers only in the area of referendum spending is apparent
at 98 S. Ct. 1425 n.34, which states in part, "Appellee does not explain why the
dissenting shareholder's wishes are entitled to such greater solicitude in this context
than in many others where equally important and controversial corporate decisions are
made by management or by a predetermined percentage of the shareholders."
A statute truly concerned with advancing the rights of minority shareholders
might give such a minority the right to compel management to communicate a particu-
lar view contrary to the view management proposed to communicate. Such a statute
would, of course, make a shambles ofthe corporate decision-making process. A require-
ment that a speaker alter the content of his proposed speech is not much more tolerable
than a requirement that enforces silence on a prospective speaker.
lu See 6A FLETHER, CORPORATIONS § 2949.2 (1968).
"2 As noted previously, see text accompanying notes 109-111 supra, such a pur-
pose may not be a "compelling" one.
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The fact that a minority of the shareholders may disagree with
the expenditure does not, it might be argued, detract from the
reasonableness of the statute since any corporate decision runs
the risk of offending some shareholders and here, at least, there
is protection for the majority. However, this means is underin-
clusive. The requirement that two-thirds of the shareholders
must approve a $1,000 referendum expenditure with no similar
requirement for other, non-communicative expenditures indi-
cates that this method protects shareholders in too narrow a
range.
As a practical matter, requiring such approval as a precon-
dition to the right to spend would, if anything, be a more seri-
ous infringement of corporate speech than allowing the expend-
iture to occur unless a certain minority takes appropriate steps
to invoke a veto. To require a corporation to obtain the affirma-
tive consent of a certain percentage of its shareholders prior to
making a particular expenditure would in many instances im-
pose a severe economic and administrative burden upon the
corporation. This would especially be so with respect to large,
publicly held corporations. '26 It may be doubted whether there
is any proposition on which two-thirds of the shareholders of
General Motors would be in agreement. What is not doubtful
is that it would be expensive to find out. The calling of a share-
holders' meeting, the solicitation of votes by proxy, and all the
other paraphernalia associated with acquiring shareholder
approval would be prohibitively expensive with respect to all
but the most vital of questions.'27 It is clear that "even when
pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means
that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected lib-
It would be less of a burden with a closely held corporation or a corporation
solely owned by a holding company, whose directors could, with comparative ease,
approve the subsidiary's expenditure. A statutory scheme that tended to favor the
political speech of closely held corporations or those wholly owned by other corpora-
tions over that of corporations owned by disparate numbers of shareholders would lend
further difficulty to a statute intruding into a delicate area where rational and precise
means must serve compelling interests.
I' Such expenses might not be tax deductible. The Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 162(e)(2), forbids such deductions. It is not inconsistent to recognize that such
spending may be a constitutional right yet not deductible for tax purposes. Cammar-
ano v. United States 358 U.S. 498 (1959). This factor, among others, may act as a
natural brake on corporate referendum spending.
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erty."12 "[I]nhibition as well as prohibition against the exer-
cise of precious first amendment rights is a power denied to
government.
11 29
The best way to achieve the goal of shareholder protection
is to rely upon the general principles of corporate control. If the
corporate choices concerning a particular referendum question
are to support it, to oppose it, or to remain silent, it would seem
far more preferable for the legislature to allow the normal forces
within the corporate entity to choose among the options. There
is no reason to think the legislature is better able than the
constituents to make a wise decision.
CONCLUSION
The Court in Bellotti affirmed that unreasonable burdens
could not be placed in the way of prospective corporate speech
on political or economic matters.' ° It will be difficult to draft
a state statute whose burden would be held a reasonable one.
It seems likely that the Bellotti case will preclude any statutory
restrictions which impose substantial and discriminatory bur-
dens upon corporate expression of opinion concerning referen-
dum questions.
'I' Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973).
In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965).
'8 The majority opinion recognized that even if the "materially affecting" stan-
dard of § 8 were appropriate, it would be unconstitutional as applied to the facts in
the case to prohibit corporate communications: "Even assuming that the rationale
behind the materially affecting requirement itself were unobjectionable, the limitation
in § 8 would have an impermissibly restraining effect on protected speech. Much
valuable information which a corporation might be able to provide would remain
unpublished. . . ." 98 S. Ct. at 1420 n.21.
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